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A Signal or a Silo? Title VII’s Unexpected Hegemony 
 
Sophia Z. Lee1  
 
 
 
 
In February 1976, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) held hearings on 
whether to continue denying its services to unions that discriminated on the basis of race or sex.2 
Board members, like administrators at a number of the major federal regulatory agencies, had 
understood the 1964 enactment of Title VII to empower them to adopt its equal employment 
mission as their own. The Board’s greatest champion of this effort, Member Howard Jenkins Jr., 
believed the Board was uniquely situated to provide “meaningful answers to the interrelated 
problems of race relations and industrial relations.”3 But after twelve years of expanding the 
scope of the Board’s antidiscrimination policies, its members had doubts. Rather than harmonize 
civil and labor rights as Jenkins had hoped, these policies, members feared, were undermining 
the right to collective action that the Board was designed to protect.4 The Board’s 1976 hearing 
only exacerbated these concerns. Attorneys for the AFL-CIO warned that employers “seek to 
defeat organization through any weapon put at hand,” and the Board’s policies were a weapon 
whose “one cutting edge directed at the ‘right to self-organization.’”5 That employers were the 
                                                 
1 Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. This was prepared for the University of Michigan 
Law School conference, A Nation of Widening Opportunities: The Civil Rights Act at 50. Thank you to the 
conference participants and especially its conveners, Ellen Katz and Samuel Bagenstos, as well as their editors. 
What follows draws on research and conversations made possible by the generosity of too many individuals and 
institutions to thank here individually but I hope they will all still accept my hearty thanks. Errors are my own.  
2 As will be explained at greater length below, the specific Board policies at issue were denying certification and 
bargaining orders to discriminatory unions.  
3 NLRB, “Howard Jenkins Sworn in for Second Term on NLRB” (August 1, 1968) (RG 25, NLRB Records 
[hereinafter NLRB Records], Committee Management Files, 1934–1974: Former Chairman Miller, 1953–1973, Box 
16, “Board Member: Howard Jenkins” Folder, National Archives and Record Administration, College Park, Md. 
[hereinafter NARA]) (all archival sources are on file with author). 
4 NLRB, “NLRB to Hear Race and Sex Arguments” (January 29, 1976) (NLRB). 
5 Brief for the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae, Trumbull et al., NLRB, February 13, 1976 [hereafter 1976 Board 
Hearing Brief—AFL-CIO] (NLRB Records, Selected Taft-Hartley Cases, 1978 [hereinafter NLRB Records-STHC-
78], FRC Boxes 54-55), 3-4. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2404397 
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only parties urging the Board to more fully import Title VII standards confirmed the labor 
lawyers’ concern.6   
For scholars attuned to labor and civil rights, as for the Board members convening that 
1976 hearing, Title VII has had a mixed legacy. On the one hand, as historian Nancy MacLean 
has demonstrated, Title VII transformed the workplace, not only opening jobs but also 
empowering workers and forging new political coalitions among women and communities of 
color.7 Labor scholar Benjamin Sachs has noted ways that Title VII facilitates collective action 
today at a time when traditional labor law is “ossified.”8 Others have sought to revitalize the 
labor movement by reframing labor rights as civil rights and amending Title VII to prohibit 
discrimination against union organizing.9 
Yet Title VII’s triumphs have come, other scholars note, at a steep cost to unions. To 
some, Title VII was based on an individual rights regime that was fundamentally adverse to the 
collective rights on which New Deal labor laws such as the Wagner Act were premised.10 To 
others, the early EEOC staff and plaintiff-side lawyers were insensitive to how unions worked 
and unreasonably destructive in their demands.11 In Black and Blue: African Americans, the 
Labor Movement, and the Decline of the Democratic Party, political scientist Paul Frymer 
                                                 
6 Official Report of Proceedings, Murcel Mfg. Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 623 (Feb. 2, 1976), No. 10-CA-10122 et. al., 
[hereinafter 1976 Board Hearing Transcript] (NLRB Records-STHC-78, FRC Boxes 54-55), 58-59, 99-100.  
7 NANCY MACLEAN, FREEDOM IS NOT ENOUGH: THE OPENING OF THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE (2008). MacLean, 
while not overlooking the law’s limits, argues that it worked a “veritable revolution in thinking about race and 
gender at work.” Id. at 2. Although scholars are right to critique the law’s limits, it is equally important that we not 
lose sight of its accomplishments.  
8 Benjamin Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685 (2008). See also Cynthia L. Estlund, 
The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527 (2002).  
9 RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG & MOSHE MARVIT, WHY LABOR ORGANIZING SHOULD BE A CIVIL RIGHTS: REBUILDING 
A MIDDLE-CLASS DEMOCRACY BY ENHANCING WORKER VOICE (2012).  
10 JEFFERSON COWIE, STAYIN’ ALIVE: THE 1970S AND THE LAST DAYS OF THE WORKING CLASS (2010); NELSON 
LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LABOR (2002); Reuel E. Schiller, The Emporium 
Capwell Case: Race, Labor Law, and Crisis of Post-War Liberalism, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 129 (2004); 
Reuel E. Schiller, From Group Rights to Individual Liberties: Post-War Labor Law, Liberalism, and the Waning of 
Union Status, 20 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (1999). 
11 JUDITH STEIN, RUNNING STEEL, RUNNING AMERICA: RACE, ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE DECLINE OF LIBERALISM 
(1998). 
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argues that decades of inaction (or insufficient action) by Congress, the Executive branch, and 
the labor movement led to a bifurcated legal regime in which the NLRB protected labor rights 
while the federal courts implemented Title VII. The courts ended up being much more effective 
at integrating unions than anyone had anticipated. But this approach left union discrimination in 
the hands of officials, attorneys, and judges who were neither familiar with unions nor motivated 
to accommodate civil and labor rights. The unfortunate result, Frymer argues, was a court-based 
civil rights regime that gravely weakened labor policy and the labor movement.12 
I have suggested elsewhere that a more unified legal regime was both more vigorously 
sought and complicated to achieve than existing scholarship recognizes.13 I explain my 
skepticism at far greater length in my book, The Workplace Constitution from the New Deal to 
the New Right, by demonstrating that efforts to fuse labor and civil rights faced daunting political 
and legal hurdles from the inception of the New Deal labor regime.14 For this fiftieth anniversary 
of Title VII, however, I focus on that law’s relationship to the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA) during Title VII’s first fifteen years. As the opening vignette suggests, efforts to charge 
the NLRB with Title VII’s implementation as a means to strengthen employment discrimination 
law while better harmonizing it with labor rights turned out to be as, if not more, detrimental to 
unions than Title VII’s enforcement by the courts. Court enforcement of Title VII dominates 
employment discrimination today partly as a result of efforts to protect workers’ right to 
collective action. 
                                                 
12 PAUL FRYMER, BLACK AND BLUE: AFRICAN AMERICANS, THE LABOR MOVEMENT, AND THE DECLINE OF THE 
DEMOCRATIC PARTY (2007). 
13 Sophia Z. Lee, Book Review, 28 LAW & HIST. REV. 554 (2010) (reviewing Frymer, supra note 11); Sophia Z. 
Lee, Untitled Paper at the Am. Ass’n of Law Sch. Panel “Solidarity: The New Antidiscrimination Law?” (January 5, 
2012); Sophia Z. Lee, Hotspots in a Cold War: The NAACP’s Postwar Workplace Constitutionalism, 1948-1964, 26 
LAW & HIST. REV. 327 (2008).  
14 SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE NEW RIGHT (forthcoming 2014). 
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Below I trace an impulse I call “Title VII as signal,” showing how Title VII was initially 
understood to instantiate a broader constitutional obligation to ensure workplace equality and to 
simultaneously heighten the federal government’s duty to fulfill that obligation. This penumbra 
emanating from Title VII encouraged the NLRB during the 1960s and 1970s to expand its 
antidiscrimination policies. In the latter half of the 1970s, however, Title VII was reconceived as 
a silo in which antidiscrimination efforts should be consolidated. This was in part because of 
concerns that the NLRB’s antidiscrimination policies came at too great a cost to its primary 
mission of ensuring workers’ right to self-organization. By 1979, employment discrimination 
enforcement was concentrated in the agency Title VII created, the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and Title VII litigation in the courts had achieved 
preeminence within that enforcement regime. This history casts doubt on the viability of a more 
harmonized labor and civil rights regime then and offers a cautionary to those eager to fuse the 
two regimes today. 
I. Title VII as Signal  
When Title VII was enacted in 1964, about one-in-four non-farm American workers 
belonged to a union.15 While this represented a drop-off from the midcentury peak of one-in-
three workers, unions were still powerful actors—so powerful, in fact, that their support was 
pivotal to Title VII’s passage.16 Similarly, the NLRB, although a political punching bag for 
business interests and anti-New Deal conservatives, was a powerful, closely watched regulatory 
agency. Indeed regulatory agencies generally loomed much larger then, presiding over major 
monopolized industries—gas and electric utilities, airlines, telecommunications—that have since 
been broken up and deregulated. These agencies were seen as potential agents of reform: when 
                                                 
15 Leo Troy, Trade Union Membership, 1897-1962, 47 REV. ECON. & STAT. 93, 94 (1965).  
16 NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, THE MOST DANGEROUS MAN IN DETROIT: WALTER REUTHER AND THE FATE OF 
AMERICAN LABOR 384-88 (1995). 
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consumer advocate Ralph Nader sent armies of law student interns out to change the world in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, they wrote carefully researched manifestos about agencies like the 
Interstate Commerce Commission.17 There was one prominent exception to this era of regulatory 
prowess: the EEOC. Indeed, so weak was the EEOC and the statute it was created to implement 
that civil rights advocates sought to strengthen the employment discrimination regime by 
disseminating Title VII’s enforcement throughout the federal government.   
A. Title VII’s Formal Weakness  
For the thirty years prior to Title VII’s enactment, moderate and conservative 
Republicans, to the extent that they supported a federal fair employment law, favored one that 
relied on voluntary compliance or at most would be enforced by the judiciary.18 Civil rights 
advocates’ experience with unions’ duty of fair representation under the federal labor laws, a 
court-enforced protection that African American workers won in 1944, made them leery of this 
approach.19 As they frequently told Congress, litigation had proved “expensive and 
cumbersome” as well as “inadequate.”20 Instead, civil rights and labor advocates as well as their 
congressional allies countered that any federal fair employment law should be enforced by an 
agency like the NLRB that had the power to adjudicate and remedy discrimination claims.21 Title 
VII, however, had required moderate and conservative Republicans’ support and thus adopted 
                                                 
17 ROBERT C. FELLMETH, RALPH NADER & CENTER FOR STUDY OF RESPONSIVE LAW, SURFACE TRANSPORTATION, 
THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE ICC (1970).  
18 The most comprehensive treatment of the partisan and political forces shaping federal fair employment law is 
ANTHONY S. CHEN, THE FIFTH FREEDOM: JOBS, POLITICS, AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1941-1972 
(2009). For a more specialized treatment of Republicans, see Anthony S. Chen, The Party of Lincoln and the 
Politics of State Fair Employment Practices Legislation in the North, 1945–1964, 112 AMER. J. SOC. 1713 (2007). 
See also David Freeman Engstrom, The Lost Origins of American Fair Employment Law: Regulatory Choice and 
the Making of Modern Civil Rights, 1943-1972, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1071 (2011).  
19 Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Tunstall v. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen and 
Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944). 
20 See, e.g., H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 278, 282 (1950) (testimony of 
Theodore E. Brown); S. Subcomm. of the Comm. on Labor and Pub. Welfare, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. S. 3295, at 30 
(1950) (testimony of Joseph Waddy). 
21 See CHEN, supra note 17, at 51-55; Engstrom, supra note 17.  
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their preferred court-enforced approach. In the opinion of the law’s civil rights supporters, this 
was a significant compromise.22  
Title VII’s first years only aggravated civil rights advocates’ concerns. The EEOC 
quickly earned a reputation for ineffectiveness. Demand outstripped the agency’s resources. The 
EEOC’s tiny staff received nearly 9,000 complaints in its first year alone, developing a backlog 
that neared 2,000. Furthermore, at first the EEOC made only limited use of the resources and 
power it had, its efforts stymied by internal strife and rapid staff turnover.23 And even after the 
EEOC got around to investigating and conciliating a complaint, the wait was not necessarily 
over. If this approach failed, complainants had to find an attorney to file a private lawsuit and 
then engage in just the kind of drawn-out litigation that had proved so “inadequate” in duty of 
fair representation cases. In 1967, two years after filing a complaint with the EEOC, workers at 
the El Dorado, Arkansas Monsanto plant reported having gained only “a feeling of depression, 
real low down.”24 
The federal courts surprised everyone with their robust enforcement of Title VII but civil 
rights advocates still worried about the law’s weaknesses.25 In some industries most employers 
were too small to be covered by Title VII, for instance.26 Even where Title VII applied, 
advocates lamented aspects of the law’s approach. There were “major limitations upon relying 
on law suits as the sole or even principal instrument of implementing fair employment policy,” 
                                                 
22 SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE UNITED STATES 
106-19 (2010); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: VOLUME 3, THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (forthcoming 
2014). 
23 James P. Gannon, Negro Hopes Wane as ’64 Civil Rights Law Founders, WALL STREET J., Jan. 13, 1967 at 10. 
MACLEAN, supra note 6, at 111; JOHN DAVID SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: POLITICS, 
CULTURE AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA 120-25 (1996).  
24 Gannon, supra note 22.   
25 FARHANG, supra note 21, at 132-47; FRYMER, supra note 11, at 70-94.. 
26 See, e.g., BROADCASTING, 1967 BROADCASTING YEARBOOK A-170 (1967). Even after Congress expanded Title 
VII in 1972 to cover smaller employers, 76% of AM stations and 86% of FM stations still fell outside the law’s 
reach. Id. The 1972 amendments had a much greater impact on television broadcasters, the proportion of which that 
fell outside the law’s coverage dropped from 85% to 12%. Id.  
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advocates insisted in 1972.27 They contended that courts lacked expertise in industries’ business 
practices, hampering their ability to determine whether employment qualifications that tended to 
exclude African Americans were justified. Lawsuits also affected only a single employer while 
industry-wide consent decrees required copious time, effort, and expense. Advocates sought a 
means to instead “induce a great deal of voluntary compliance.”28  
B. Title VII’s Penumbral Strength 
For those who thought lawsuits were not the best, or at least should not be the exclusive, 
way to counter workplace discrimination, Title VII nonetheless held promise. Even before Title 
VII’s passage, some government officials acknowledged a national policy against employment 
discrimination that derived from the Constitution.29 Although Congress technically relied on the 
Commerce Clause to authorize Title VII, the law was believed by many to also codify this 
constitutionally grounded antidiscrimination requirement.30 Officials argued that Title VII 
strengthened this national policy against discrimination and indicated that all government 
officials should implement its aims.31 At the same time, Title VII’s constitutional roots meant 
that government actors were not bound by the law’s formal limits.32 Title VII, the Justice 
                                                 
27 William L. Taylor, Problems in Developing and Enforcing Fair Employment Law in the United States, Speech to 
the Villa Sebelloni Conference at Lake Como, Italy 18-19 (October 2-6, 1972) (transcript available in the University 
of Notre Dame Archives, Howard A Glickstein Papers, MGLI 20.2539) 
28 Id. Taylor was very involved in the Leadership Conference for Civil Rights, an umbrella group of liberal 
organizations, many of which were pursuing the strategy Taylor advocated. See LEE, supra note 13, at ch. 10.   
29 Memorandum from N. Thompson Powers to Norbert A. Schlei 3 (July 8, 1963) (Department of Justice Records, 
John F. Kennedy Library, micro-copy NK-2, roll 91, “Employment,” NARA) (enclosing FCC memo). 
30 See, e.g., 33 Fed. Reg. 9960, 9964 (July 11, 1968). See also 118 CONG. REC. 3959, 3960-61, 3965 (1972). This 
was reflected in federal courts’ assumption that Title VII violations were coextensive with violations of the equal 
protection clause. See Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 958 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (collecting cases), rev’d, 426 
U.S. 229 (1976). See generally SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
REVOLUTION 106-10, 132-36 (2011). 
31 Nondiscrimination in Employment Practices of Broadcast Licensees, 33 Fed. Reg. 9960, 9960-62 (July 11, 1968). 
32 Hearing on Responsibilities of the Federal Power Commission in the Area of Civil Rights, Before the Subcomm. 
on Civil Rights Oversight of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 90 (1972) (letter from David J. Bardin to Lee 
C. White) [hereinafter Responsibilities]. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 797, 824, 824d (2006); Responsibilities, supra, at 
99-109, 104 n.10, 106, 109 (letter from Robert A. Jablon to David J. Bardin); Nondiscrimination in Employment 
Practices of Broadcast Licensees, 33 Fed. Reg. at 9960-62. 
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Department advised, did not “circumscribe the authority of Federal agencies . . . to regulate 
employment practices.”33 Agencies were instead free to regulate in Title VII’s name even if they 
exceeded its formal provisions. 
C. Title VII’s Dissemination  
Federal officials made use of Title VII’s penumbra. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted rules requiring all broadcasters and 
common carriers to adopt equal employment policies. Broadcasters had argued that Congress in 
Title VII delegated “regulatory power over civil rights” to the EEOC, not the FCC.34 The FCC 
disagreed, reasoning that the “national policy against discrimination in employment” was 
“particularly embodied” in Title VII but was not limited to its provisions.35 The agency therefore 
imposed equal employment requirements, including on broadcasters too small to trigger Title VII 
coverage.36 At the Federal Power Commission (FPC), attorneys likewise argued that the 
agency’s duty to regulate in the public interest obligated it to consider the national policy against 
discrimination when licensing or certificating utilities. As at the FCC, they reasoned that because 
Title VII embodied but did not delimit this policy, the FPC could demand equal employment 
even from utilities that were not technically violating Title VII.37 Similar arguments were made 
by officials from numerous federal agencies.38 
Other than the FCC, the agency that made the most use of Title VII’s penumbra was the 
NLRB. The Board had long policed some types of racism in the workplace, prohibiting unions 
                                                 
33 Nondiscrimination in Employment Practices of Broadcast Licensees, 33 Fed. Reg. at 9960-62 (statement of 
Stephen J. Pollak to Rosel H. Hyde).  
34 Id. at 9960-62. 
35 Id. at 9961-62. 
36 See BROADCASTING, supra note 26. 
37 Responsibilities, at 90, 99-109, 104 n.10, 106, 109. 
38 For more on agencies’ equal employment debates, see LEE, supra note 11, at ch. 8, 10; Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, 
and Rulemaking: Administrative Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799 
(2010).  
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from designating the group of workers it would represent (called a “bargaining unit”) based 
solely on those workers’ race and regulating the use of racially charged speech during union 
election campaigns.39 If a union demonstrated sufficient worker support, the NLRB would 
“certify” it as the exclusive representative of all workers in the bargaining unit. In the 1940s the 
NLRB promised to rescind the certification of any union that failed to fairly represent the 
African Americans in its bargaining unit, but the Board defined fair representation narrowly. As 
the NAACP’s Labor Secretary quipped in 1949, under the Board’s policy, “[u]nions may 
exclude colored people from membership, they may segregate them into separate locals and they 
may refuse to let them share in the full benefits of the union, but no union may discriminate 
against them because of race.”40 In the 1950s, spurred in part by Brown v. Board of Education, 
the Board put more teeth in its existing antidiscrimination policies.41 In the early 1960s, even 
before Title VII was enacted, it further strengthened them, including by finally decertifying a 
union for segregating its membership by race—a decision it symbolically released the same day 
President Johnson signed Title VII into law.42  
Title VII’s enactment did not dampen the Board’s policy innovations. One member 
contended that the law had affirmed the Board’s obligation to police racial discrimination.43 
Others, faced with charges that Title VII, once enacted, became the exclusive basis for policing 
workplace discrimination, insisted that it “had not . . . limit[ed] the Board’s duty or authority in 
                                                 
39 See, e.g., U.S. Bedding Co., 52 N.L.R.B. 382 (1943). For an excellent treatment of the Board’s election speech 
regulations, see FRYMER, supra note 11, ch. 5. 
40 Speech of Clarence A. Mitchell on the Fair Employment Practices Commission, (Jul. 14, 1949), in PAPERS OF THE 
NAACP, PART 1: MEETINGS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, RECORDS OF ANNUAL CONFERENCES, MAJOR SPEECHES, 
AND SPECIAL REPORTS, 1909-1950, (Randolph Boehm and August Meier, eds.) reel 12 (1982).  
41 LEE, supra note 11, at ch. 5. 
42 Id. at ch. 7.  
43 Jubilee Mfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B 272, 275-76, 278 (1973) (Jenkins, Member, dissenting). 
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this area.”44 Over the next ten years, the Board found repeatedly that unions’ racially 
discriminatory practices violated their duty of fair representation and constituted an “unfair labor 
practice” under all three of the possible statutory provisions. 45 The latter legal tools were the 
most union-friendly because they allowed the Board to order a union to remedy its 
discriminatory practices without threatening its status as the bargaining unit’s representative. The 
Board also extended its antidiscrimination policies to reach employers who were complicit in 
unions’ discrimination or who failed to bargain in good faith about their own discriminatory 
policies.46 In 1974, the Board, after much internal deliberation and dissensus, established its 
most aggressive antidiscrimination policy yet. In Bekins Moving & Storage Co., the Board 
refused to certify a union that had won an election on the grounds that it had in the past 
demonstrated a “propensity” to discriminate.47  
II. Title VII as Silo  
Even as Title VII fed equal employment policy innovation in federal agencies, some 
officials pushed back against the trend. The FPC, for instance, recognized in 1970 the “national 
policy that discrimination in employment is to be eliminated by all elements of our society, 
public and private.”48 But it contended that it was not authorized to require equal employment 
from the utilities it regulated because employment discrimination was not sufficiently related to 
any of its regulatory purposes.49 Several years later, its lawyers asked the Supreme Court to “set 
                                                 
44 Edward B. Miller, A View from the NLRB, Speech at the Kansas City Bar Association Seminar 8, 12, 20 (Apr. 
11, 1974) (transcript available in UAW Washington Office: Steve Schlossberg Collection, Box 23, Folder 6, 
Archive of Labor and Urban Affairs, Walter P. Reuther Library, Wayne State University, Detroit, Mich.). See 
generally LEE, supra note 11, at ch. 9.  
45 Galveston Mar. Ass’n., Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 897, 898 (1964); Rubber Workers (AFL-CIO) Local 12 (Business 
League of Gadsden), 150 N.L.R.B. 312, 314-15 (1964); Houston Mar. Ass’n., Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 615 (1967); 
Astrove Plumbing & Heating Corp., 152 N.L.R.B. 1093 (1965).  
46 Houston Mar. Ass’n., Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 615 (1967); Farmers’ Coop. Compress, 169 N.L.R.B. 290 (1968). 
47 Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 211 N.L.R.B. 138 (1974), overruled by Handy Andy, 211 N.L.R.B. 138 (1974). 
48 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 44 F.P.C. 1365, 1366-68 (1970). 
49 Id. See generally LEE, supra note 11, at ch. 10.  
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the fences” between the nation’s antidiscrimination and economic regulatory statutes.50 Agency 
oversight of utilities’ employment practices, they argued, would draw the FPC into a “hopeless 
morass . . . of litigation” it was ill equipped to handle.51 The FPC declined to adopt equal 
employment policies because its leadership’s politics changed after Richard Nixon’s election in 
1968. Nixon appointees to the NLRB, in contrast, embraced their agency’s antidiscrimination 
duties. Yet they too began to see the need to set some fences between the NLRA and Title VII. 
A. Title VII and Mission Preservation 
Edward Miller, Nixon’s choice for NLRB Chairman, was enthusiastic about the Board’s 
antidiscrimination responsibilities. In the early 1970s, he undertook an ambitious effort to 
develop a comprehensive policy for handling claims of union discrimination52 and gave speeches 
touting the Board’s antidiscrimination responsibilities.53 He insisted that Title VII “had not . . . 
limit[ed] the Board’s duty or authority in this area.”54 But he worried about making the Board, 
which already suffered from an infamous backlog, too attractive an alternative to Title VII.  
During the latter half of the 1960s, when the Board innovated and Title VII disappointed, 
commentators praised the Board’s policies and argued that they were superior to Title VII.55 One 
author lauded the NLRB’s well-established administrative machinery, experienced staff, and 
                                                 
50 Transcript of Oral Argument at 1-2, 9, NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662 (1976) (Nos. 74-1619, 74-1608) 1-2, 9 
(available in the Records of the Center for National Policy Review, Box 126, Folder 3, Library of Congress 
Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.). 
51 Id. at 9. 
52 See generally the documents collected in RG 25, National Labor Relations Board, Program Correspondence Files, 
1934-79: Group II Former Chairmen, 1935-74 [hereafter NLRB Papers—GFC], Box 5, “Rules Revision: 
Revocation of Certification and/or Withholding of Certification” Folder, NARA. 
53 Miller, supra note 42. The Board members saw this duty as deriving from the Constitution rather than Title VII. 
See LEE, supra note 11, at ch. 9. 
54 Miller, supra note 42, at 8, 12, 20. Jenkins went further, contending that Title VII had in fact affirmed the Board’s 
obligation to police racial discrimination. Jubilee Mfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. at 275-76, 278 (Jenkins, Member, 
dissenting). 
55 See, e.g., Robert L. Molinar, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. 
L. REV. 601, 602 (1965); Herbert Hill, The Role of Law in Securing Equal Employment Opportunity: Legal Powers 
and Social Change, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 625, 648 (1965); Sanford Jay Rosen, The Law and Racial 
Discrimination in Employment, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 729, 795 (1965).  
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swifter, more economical approach.56 The Board had “sharper enforcement teeth than Congress 
has provided minority workers in recent civil-rights legislation,” another observed.57 The free 
legal services the General Counsel’s office provided and the public hearings the Board held 
could also draw complaints to the NLRB and away from the EEOC.58 Indeed, African 
Americans were reportedly “claim[ing that] their demands for equal job opportunities have been 
frustrated under both the law [(Title VII)] and agency [(EEOC)] specifically created by Congress 
to deal with race bias.”59 After a federal appeals court ruled that the Board could sanction 
employer discrimination even in nonunion workplaces, one government official predicted that 
the Board “could put the [EEOC] . . . out of business.”60 
This was an outcome Miller wanted to avoid. He worried that if the Board’s policies were 
coextensive with Title VII, it would be “so inundated with cases that its procedures would bog 
down in a hopeless morass.”61 As a result, he implemented more narrow antidiscrimination 
policies than Title VII required. In 1968, a federal court remanded a case to the Board to 
determine whether an employer engaged in a “pattern or practice” of racial discrimination (a 
term lifted straight from Title VII) and therefore should be subject to an unfair labor practice 
order for “interfer[ing] with, restrain[ing] or coerc[ing] employees in the exercise of their rights” 
                                                 
56 Sam Barone, The Impact of Recent Developments in Civil Rights on Employers and Unions, 17 LAB. L.J. 413 
(1966). See also William B. Gould, The Negro Revolution and the Law of Collective Bargaining, 34 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 207, 246-49 (1965). 
57 Louis M. Kohlmeier, NLRB’s Role in Job Bias Disputes Is Enhanced by the Supreme Court, WALL ST. J., Nov. 
11, 1969, at 3. 
58 Murray Seeger, NLRB May Be Forced to Rule on Bias Cases, L.A. TIMES, March 16, 1969, 14. See also, “Hail 
Court’s Bias Case Ruling as Legal Landmark for Labor,” Chicago Defender, December. 6, 1969, at 36. 
59 Kohlmeier, supra note 55.   
60 Seeger, supra note 56.  
61 Miller, supra note 42, at 16. How much Miller needed to fear this outcome by the early 1970s is unclear; counter 
to predictions, the Board had not received a large number of discrimination charges. Interview of Frank McCulloch 
by Barbara Stoyle Mulhallen, in Charlottesville, Va. 90 (Sept. 5, 1989) (available at the Kheel Center for Labor-
Management Documentation and Archives, M.P. Catherwood Library at Cornell University, Collection 5843, Box 1, 
Folder 1159). 
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to self-organization under the NLRA.62 Such a policy could empower the NLRB to remedy 
employer discrimination at the vast majority of non-unionized workplaces. Miller rejected the 
court’s premise that any pattern or practice of discrimination would be grounds for an unfair 
labor practice order. Instead, the Board would issue such orders only where there was a “direct 
relationship between the alleged discrimination” and workers’ exercise of their rights under the 
NLRA.63 He also rejected the disparate impact standard the Supreme Court adopted under Title 
VII, finding that racial imbalance or disparate effects alone were insufficient to prove union and 
employer discrimination.64 
B. Title VII and Employer Pretext  
In addition to bureaucratic overload, Board members worried that their antidiscrimination 
policies were facilitating employer intransigence. In the 1960s and 1970s, resisting unionization 
at all costs became a mainstream business position. A new “union avoidance” industry of 
lawyers and consultants advised employers to delay elections and, if unsuccessful, put off 
signing a contract as long as possible.65 An employer could accomplish both aims by charging 
the union with discrimination, either to prevent its certification as representative or as grounds 
for the Board to deny the union an order requiring the employer to bargain in good faith. 
Chairman Miller’s replacement, Betty Southard Murphy, was the Board’s first female member, 
the only woman at the helm of a major regulatory agency, and a strong proponent of “civil rights 
and equal employment opportunity for workers.”66 Worried about “employer[s] raising for 
                                                 
62 United Packinghouse, Food, & Allied Workers Int’l v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126, 1130, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1969).  
63 Jubilee Mfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. at 272-73. 
64 Mansion House Center Mgmt. Corp., 190 N.L.R.B. 437, 437 n.3 (1971); Farmers’ Coop. Compress, 194 N.L.R.B. 
at 86-87, 89. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the Supreme Court recognized disparate impact 
claims under Title VII.  
65 For more on the union avoidance industry see  LEE, supra note 11, at ch. 11.. 
66 “Biography,” August 14, 1974 (RG 6891, WHCF Name Files, Box 2268, “Murphy, Betty Southard” Folder, 
Gerald R. Ford Library and Archive, Ann Arbor, Mich.). 
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pretextual reasons . . . that a union discriminated racially,” however, she called the 1976 Board 
hearings to reconsider her agency’s antidiscrimination policies.67  
The employers who appeared at the hearing underscored the problem. Bell & Howell 
claimed a union’s sex discrimination barred it from representing the company’s all-male 
stationary engineers. Trumbull Asphalt Company, Inc. accused a Teamsters local organizing its 
all-white, all-male truck drivers of race and sex discrimination.68 At the time of the hearings, 
these unions’ petitions were already 2-3 years old. “[I]t is just outrageous for an employer who 
was the discriminator” to be bringing these charges, the Teamsters’ lawyer charged at the 
Board’s 1976 hearing.69 
Meanwhile, civil rights advocates had abandoned these claims. From the 1940s to the 
1960s, the NAACP waged a decades-long fight to convince the Board to police discrimination 
more aggressively. Although it greeted enthusiastically the Board’s early 1960s decision to do 
so, by the 1970s it had all but ceased bringing discrimination charges before the Board. When the 
NLRB issued an open call to participate in its 1976 hearings, no one from the NAACP 
responded. The most obvious explanation would seem to be that the NAACP had decided Title 
VII litigation in the courts was a more fruitful avenue. Yet the NAACP continued to pursue 
equal employment policies before other regulatory agencies.70 With its labor allies concerned 
that the Board’s antidiscrimination policies would give union opponents “an opportunity to 
destroy collective bargaining in this country,” the NAACP likely decided that the NLRB 
remedies were not worth defending.71 
                                                 
67 NLRB, NLRB to Hear Race and Sex Arguments, (Jan. 29, 1976) (on file with author). 
68 1976 Board Hearing Transcript, 44, 67. 
69 Id. at 53. 
70 LEE, supra note 11, at ch. 10, 11. 
71 Letter from Plato E. Papps to Edward B. Miller (Aug. 6, 1973) (NLRB Papers—GFC, Box 5, “Rules Revision: 
Revocation of Certification and/or Withholding of Certification” Folder). 
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C. The Three Branches Disentangle Title VII  
During the second half of the 1970s, the Supreme Court, Congress, and the President 
enclosed Title VII—and employment discrimination policy more generally—in a legal and 
institutional silo. The Court was first to act. In the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court disentangled 
Title VII from the Constitution and federal regulatory statutes such as the NLRA. In its 1975 
Emporium Capwell v. Western Addition Community Organization decision, a nearly unanimous 
Court ruled that the NLRB did not have to protect employees discharged for protesting employer 
discrimination after they rejected working through their union to redress it.72 Employees’ right to 
be free from discrimination “cannot be pursued at the expense of the orderly collective-
bargaining process contemplated by the NLRA,” the Court held.73 The fact that Title VII’s anti-
retaliation provisions may have protected the employees did not mean that the NLRA had to. 
Read most broadly, the Board appeared under no duty to counter discrimination if doing so 
would frustrate its core statutory mission.74  
The next year, the Court further disentangled Title VII. NAACP v. Federal Power 
Commission reaffirmed and refined the principle the Court had laid down in Emporium Capwell. 
Again a unanimous Court rejected the premise that regulatory agencies had a broad mandate to 
implement the national policy against discrimination. “Setting the fences” just as the FPC had 
asked, the Court ruled that agencies need only implement antidiscrimination if it was related to 
their primary statutory mission.75 Further undermining agencies’ authority to diffuse Title VII’s 
antidiscrimination mandate throughout the federal bureaucracy, the Court erected a similar 
                                                 
72 420 U.S. 50 (1975). 
73 Id. at 69. 
74 Id. at 66, 69, 71-72.  
75 NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662 (1976). 
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boundary between the Constitution and Title VII in Washington v. Davis.76 Contrary to the 
assumption of federal courts and government officials, the Court declined to hold that the 
“constitutional standard for adjudicating claims of invidious racial discrimination is identical to 
the standards applicable under Title VII.”77 Henceforward, only Title VII would protect against 
non-intentional discrimination. 
During 1977 and 1978 the executive branch and Congress similarly disentangled 
employment discrimination policy from the federal bureaucracy and consolidated it under the 
EEOC. In February 1977, President Carter announced that he intended to concentrate 
implementation of federal employment discrimination policies.78 One year later, he sent a plan to 
Congress that centralized enforcement of nearly 40 different equal employment requirements 
handled by nearly twenty different agencies under the EEOC.79 “Fragmentation of authority 
among a number of federal agencies,” Carter contended “has meant confusion and ineffective 
enforcement for employees, regulatory duplication and needless expense for employers.”80 That 
summer, Congress allowed the plan to go into effect.81 With “[v]irtually all the groups protected 
by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act . . . support[ing]” the plan, the era of policy dissemination 
was over.82  
D. The NLRB Reverses Course 
                                                 
76 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
77 Id. at 239, 243-45. 
78 Editorial, The Equal Employment Mess, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1977, at 15. 
79 One Voice for Equal Employment, PHILADELPHIA TRIB., Jan. 31, 1978, at 6; President Sends Congress Master 
Plan on Job Rights, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1978, at A2. 
80 President Sends Congress Master Plan on Job Rights, supra note 77, at A2. 
81 Carter’s First Big Push for Reorganizing Government Is Seen Taking Effect Today, WALL ST. J., May 5, 1978, at 
10; Martin Tolchin, Grappling With the Monster of Bureaucracy, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1978, at E2. 
82 One Voice for Equal Employment, supra note 77, at 6. The final plan left some enforcement with the Office of 
Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) at the Department of Labor after Carter was unable to overcome 
congressional resistance. Even this exception proved the centralizing rule, however, as the plan similarly withdrew 
contract enforcement authority from contracting agencies and concentrated it in OFCC.  
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With pressure to incorporate employment discrimination into Board policy removed, the 
Board rejected the policies it found most likely to hurt its primary statutory mission. In 1977, the 
Board decided the cases that had been the subject of its hearings. Denying certification or 
bargaining orders to discriminatory unions, the Board held, gave employers “an incentive to 
inject charges of union racial discrimination into Board . . . proceedings as a delaying tactic . . . 
rather than to attack racial discrimination.”83 These policies thus “significantly impair[ed] the 
national labor policy of facilitating collective bargaining, the enforcement of which is our 
primary function,” the Board concluded, and denied workers’ right to a representative of their 
choosing.84 
The Board noted that the Supreme Court’s fence-laying decisions supported its decision. 
When enforcing the challenged policies, a federal appellate court had previously required the 
Board to assess discrimination using the same statistical methods that courts used when they 
were applying Title VII. The appellate court had done so, however, because it held that the 
NLRB was constitutionally obligated to police discrimination and assumed that Title VII 
established the standard for this constitutional duty. The appellate court’s approach, the Board 
now found, had not survived Washington v. Davis, which, the Board observed, had separated the 
two. The Board was thus free to reject the Title VII evidentiary standards the appellate court 
preferred. Emporium Capwell had recognized that the Board must interpret the NLRA in light of 
“the national labor policy” but had rejected the proposition that the NLRA “should give way to 
the paramount value of combating racial discrimination,” the Board also reasoned. NAACP had 
further clarified that when implementing national antidiscrimination policy, “consideration must 
                                                 
83 Handy Andy, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 447, 452-53, 456 (1977). The other decisions were Bell & Howell Co., 230 
N.L.R.B. 420 (1977); Murcel Manufacturing Co., 231 N.L.R.B. 623 (1977); Trumbull Asphalt Co., 230 N.L.R.B. 
646 (1977). 
84 Handy Andy, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. at 452-53,456.  
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be given to whether such action promotes or runs counter to the [NLRA’s] basic policies and 
purposes.” Because the certification and bargaining policies the Board was reconsidering 
impeded its “primary function” of “facilitating collective bargaining,” the Board found that it 
was justified in rejecting them.85 
The NLRB faced no resistance for this turnaround. Congress’s approval of Carter’s 
reorganization plan in 1978 ratified the spirit of the NLRB’s approach. In 1979, the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals put the judiciary’s more specific stamp of approval on the Board’s decision to 
carefully limit its antidiscrimination policies. In Bell & Howell Co. v. NLRB, the court found that 
the Board’s statutory purpose gave it a role in countering discrimination. The court nonetheless 
found this obligation better satisfied by the post-certification remedies the Board developed in 
the 1960s, such as issuing unfair labor practice orders against unions that violated their duty of 
fair representation or possibly decertifying them. These, the court held, were more “consistent 
with the other policies of the” NLRA.86 Henceforth, the NLRB would police discrimination only 
in unionized workplaces and only according to its more narrowly defined notion of 
discrimination. The days of it serving as a serious competitor to the EEOC were over for good. 
Conclusion: TVII’s Unexpected Hegemony 
Scholars today write wistfully of an alternate legal regime that could have better 
harmonized antidiscrimination with labor law’s recognition of workers’ right to organize and 
bargain collectively. During Title VII’s uncertain first fifteen years, advocates, legislators, 
administrators, and workers sought to disseminate enforcement of Title VII’s mandate 
throughout administrative agencies, pursuing a more powerful Title VII and one more 
harmonized with labor rights. But empowering Title VII via dissemination proved less effective 
                                                 
85 Bell & Howell Co., 230 N.L.R.B. at 421-23; Handy Andy, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. at 451. 
86 Bell & Howell Co. v. N.L.R.B., 598 F.2d 136, 147, (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
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than its proponents expected while achieving a more harmonious regime was more complicated 
than is currently thought. Title VII litigation’s domination of employment discrimination law 
today was not inevitable, immediate, or particularly desired at the law’s inception. Fifteen years 
on, however, it had become the consensus position across government, as well as among civil 
rights and labor advocates.  
While only speculative, this history should give pause to those who advocate 
incorporating labor rights under Title VII. Just as incorporating antidiscrimination into labor law 
threatened workers’ right to organize in the 1970s, incorporating labor rights into Title VII in the 
twenty-first century might threaten what is left of antidiscrimination law today. The EEOC is 
already overloaded—perhaps even more than the NLRB was in the 1970s—while the courts 
have steadily weakened Title VII.87 Yet employers have gutted labor law with greater vigor and 
coordination than they have employment discrimination law.88 Indeed, as this history shows, 
employer hostility to unions has at times fostered support for antidiscrimination laws.89 Given 
the challenges already facing employment discrimination law today, it might be best to keep the 
two regimes separate, especially if Title VII is currently proving a useful tool in organizing 
campaigns.90  
                                                 
87 See, e.g., the other articles from this symposium.  
88 For instance, Title VII’s anti-retaliation provisions remain one area in which the courts still robustly interpret the 
law. See Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011). But see University of Texas 
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013). Title VII’s superior anti-retaliation provision is 
precisely why Benjamin Sachs has advocated using Title VII as a way around deficiencies in labor law protections 
for worker organizing. Sachs, supra note 7, at 2690.  
89 See also JENNIFER DELTON, RACIAL INTEGRATION IN CORPORATE AMERICA, 1940-1990 (2009); LEE, supra note 
11, at ch. 8, 9, 11.  
90 Sachs, supra note 7. 
